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Presidential Power Grab or Pure State Might? A
Modern Debate Over Executive Interpretations on
Federalism
I. INTRODUCTION
President William J. Clinton recently addressed prominent state
and local officials as well as many foreign dignitaries at a conference
on federalism. In his opening remarks, he observed, “I think it is
quite an interesting thing that we have this impressive array of people
to come to a conference on federalism, a topic that probably 10 or
20 years ago would have been viewed as a substitute for a sleeping
pill.”1
Yet President Clinton’s position on federalism has received siz-
able attention as of late. Federalism is a hot topic in the executive
branch, as well as other branches of the government, with the Su-
preme Court hearing several cases dealing specifically with the limits
of congressional power in its 1999-2000 term,2 and Congress push-
ing federalism bills through the House and the Senate to codify fed-
eralism philosophy.3 It was President Clinton’s enactment of Execu-
tive Order 13,083 in 1998, however, that united, as well as enraged,
state and local groups in an effort to return to federalism policy as set
by President Ronald Reagan in 1987.
Over the course of the past year, President Clinton has issued
not one, but three, executive orders delineating the executive
branch’s policy on federalism. Executive Order 13,083 (“1998 Or-
1. President William J. Clinton, Address at the Forum of Federation Conference (Oct.
11, 1999), available in WESTLAW at 1999 WL 24361603.
2. See Joan Biskupic, High Court to Tackle Key Social, Political Issues, WASH. POST,
Oct. 4, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter High Court]; Joan Biskupic, National Court Support for State
Power Evident in Arguments: Recent Decisions Erode Federalism, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Apr. 1, 1999, at A19 [hereinafter National Court Support]; David Jackson, Federal
Power Top Issue for High Court, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 4, 1999, at A5; Theodore B. Olson,
Rule of Law: Aaaand They’re Off! The Justices Go to Work, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1999, at A43;
Gaylord Shaw, Key Issues Await High Court, NEWSDAY (Long Island), Oct. 4, 1999, at A4.
3. See generally The Federalism Act of 1999, H.R. 2245, 106th Cong. (1999); The
Federalism Accountability Act of 1999, S. 1214, 106th Cong. (1999); The Federalism Preser-
vation Act of 1999, H.R. 2960, 106th Cong. (1999).
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der”)4 was the first and most provocative. Quietly issued in May, the
1998 Order changed, without consulting state and local officials, the
executive branch federalism policy that had been in place since Presi-
dent Reagan’s Executive Order 12,612 (“Reagan Order”).5 It was
originally scheduled to take effect on August 12, 1998;6 however,
under a barrage of criticism from members of Congress and state and
local interest groups,7 President Clinton issued Executive Order
13,095 (“Suspension Order”),8 indefinitely suspending the imple-
mentation of the 1998 Order. Opponents claimed that the 1998
Order was “wrongheaded and unacceptable,” a “serious step back-
ward” from the previous Reagan Order signed in 1987, and de-
manded that the order be withdrawn.9 The Clinton camp responded
by stating, “ ‘We thought there were no real substantive changes . . .
but in retrospect, it wouldn’t have hurt’ to review the new language
with the state and local officials.”10
The suspension of the 1998 Order allowed time for state and lo-
cal governments to consult with the Clinton administration about
federalism policy issues.11 After over a year of negotiations between
state leaders and the White House,12 Executive Order 13,132
(“1999 Order”)13 was issued in August of last year. It has been
touted as “strengthening the partnership with state and local gov-
4. Exec. Order No. 13,083, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,651(1998). For the text of this order, see
Appendix A.
5. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987). For the text of this order,
see Appendix A.
6. See David S. Broder, White House to Rewrite Federalism Order, Now With State-
Local Input, WASH. POST, July 29, 1998, at A19.
7. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Executive Order Urged Consulting, But Didn’t, WASH.
POST, July 16, 1998, at A15 [hereinafter Executive Order]; Broder, supra note 6, at A19; Fred
Thompson, Big-Government Power Grab, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1998, at B5.
8. Exec. Order No. 13,095, 63 Fed. Reg. 42,565 (1998). For the text of this order,
see Appendix A.
9. See Broder, supra note 6, at A19.
10. Broder, Executive Order, supra note 7, at A15 (quoting White House Spokesman
Barry J. Toiv).
11. See Exec. Order No. 13,095, supra note 8 (stating that “in order to enable full and
adequate consultation with State and local elected officials, their representative organizations,
and other interested parties, it is hereby ordered that Executive Order 13083, entitled ‘Feder-
alism,’ is suspended”).
12. See Clarence Anthony, New Executive Order Protects Local Authority, Strengthens
Federalism, NATION’S CITIES WKLY., Aug. 16, 1999, at 2.
13. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.S. §
601 (1999). For the text of this order, see Appendix A.
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ernment,”14 and “a very positive development” by state and local
leaders.15 In a letter to President Clinton, Clarence Anthony, Presi-
dent of the National League of Cities, stated that state and local
groups have been “encouraged by your commitment to crafting an
enforceable executive order that seeks to balance the needs of fed-
eral, state, and local governments in order to achieve that true part-
nership among all levels of government envisioned by America’s
founding fathers.”16 As it happened, however, the “balance” struck
by the 1999 Order was actually a near-complete reinstatement of the
Reagan Order. With few exceptions, every change attempted by the
1998 Order has been changed back to the original language of the
Reagan Order, and much of the Reagan language has even been
strengthened.
This Comment traces the evolution of the 1999 Order. Part II
gives a brief history of the use of executive orders and describes how
they are used today. Part III gives an introduction to the major
ideological contents of the Reagan Order and the 1998 and 1999
Clinton Orders and describes the events surrounding their creation.
Part IV compares the orders’ major substantive aspects, and demon-
strates how state and local groups’ wishes have prevailed. It also ar-
gues that had the 1998 Order remained in place, the Order would
have allowed the executive branch to regulate in areas traditionally
outside its regulatory authority and wrongly impinged on state self-
government. Part IV concludes that President Clinton’s attempt to
broaden executive discretion in matters affecting state interests back-
fired, actually resulting in a strengthening of state and local control.
Part V briefly compares what has happened in the executive branch
with what is currently happening in the judicial and legislative
branches. It concludes that, at least in the short-term, further at-
tempts by the executive branch to enhance federal power vis-à-vis the
states are unlikely to succeed. Regardless, the federalism debate is far
from disappearing in both the legislature and the judiciary.
14. David S. Broder, Federalism’s New Framework: Revised Order Satisfies State and Lo-
cal Officials, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1999, at A21 (quoting Mickey Ibarra, Assistant to the
President for Intergovernmental Affairs).
15. Anthony, supra note 12.
16. Christine Becker, White House Fixes Federalism Edict; Cities Laud Move, NATION’S
CITIES WKLY., Aug. 9, 1999, at 1.
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II. BACKGROUND
To date, there is very little law or scholarship on executive or-
ders. In fact, there is no law or executive order that even defines “ex-
ecutive order.”17 “Essentially an Executive order or proclamation is a
written document issued by the President and titled as such by him
or at his direction. Because of this, a precise statement uniformly ap-
plicable to the contents of Executive orders and proclamations is im-
possible.”18 Nevertheless, examining the history, limitations, and
scope of executive orders provides insight into their practical effect.
A. History of Executive Orders
Executive orders have been used since the time of George
Washington.19 The earliest executive orders provided for withdrawal
of public land for Indian use, building lighthouses, and supplement-
ing acts of Congress.20 Executive orders were quite informal. Some-
times the president would simply write “I approve” or “Let it be
done” on a cabinet member’s proposal.21
The Federal Register Act of 1935,22 however, required executive
orders to be published in the Federal Register. During the early days
of the New Deal, executive orders rose to new prominence; Presi-
dent Roosevelt issued 674 executive orders in fifteen months.23
President Roosevelt subsequently issued Executive Order 7,298, pre-
scribing the manner in which proposed executive orders were to be
prepared.24 Since that time, presidents have followed prescribed pro-
17. See HOUSE COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., EXECUTIVE
ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 1 n.1 (Comm.
Print 1957) [hereinafter STUDY] (stating that Exec. Order No. 10,006, governing executive
orders, does not define the term).
18. Id. at 1.
19. See Robert C. Cash, Note, Presidential Power: Use and Enforcement of Executive Or-
ders, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 44, 44 (1963).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 46.
22. 14 U.S.C. § 1505 (1999).
23. See STUDY, supra note 17, at 2.
24. Executive Order 7298 was replaced by Executive Order 10,006, 13 Fed. Reg. 5927
(1948), and finally by Executive Order 11,030, 3 C.F.R. 610 (1959-1963), reprinted in 44
U.S.C. § 1505 (1995), which provided criteria executive orders should follow. Presidential
orders or proclamations were to have a title, contain a citation of authority under which it was
issued, and use proper punctuation, spelling and capitalization. All drafts were to be approved,
and proposed orders were first to be submitted to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget
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cedures for issuing executive orders.
B. Source of Authority for, and Limitations on, Executive Orders
Scholars have long debated the scope of presidential powers25
and have proposed three general theories. The most restrictive the-
ory is that Article II, Section I of the Constitution contains an enu-
meration of executive powers by which the president must be able to
justify his or her actions.26 An intermediate theory is that the presi-
dent is a steward of the people, and, as such, he has a duty to take
action as needed unless it is specifically prohibited by either the laws
of the United States or the Constitution.27 Finally, the third theory is
that the president has the discretion and the power to act for the
public good without express legal authority, and even in direct con-
flict with laws that the president believes to be contrary to the com-
mon good.28 Franklin D. Roosevelt once said, “In the event that the
Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept the re-
sponsibility, and I will act.”29 A president obviously acts with the
clearest authority when he or she acts within one of the enumerated
powers.30 Yet the outer limits of this authority are not always clear.
Presidential power can also be delegated or limited by congres-
sional declarations of public policy.31 The determination of public
accompanied by a signed letter from the authorized officer of the originating federal agency
explaining the order and its relation to any current laws or other executive orders. If the Bu-
reau of the Budget approved the document, it was to be sent to the Attorney General for his or
her consideration as to both form and legality. Nothing in the order was to be construed to
apply to treaties, conventions, protocols, or other international agreements, or proclamations
of the president. See STUDY, supra note 17, at 2-3.
25. See William D. Neighbors, Comment, Presidential Legislation by Executive Order, 37
U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 108 (1964).
26. See id. The principal advocate of this view was United States President and Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court William Howard Taft. See id. (citing WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT,
OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 16 (1925 ed.)).
27. See id. The chief supporter of this theory was Theodore Roosevelt. See id. (citing
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984 at 152-53 (Randall
W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1957)).
28. See id. This theory is based on a statement made by John Locke: “He that will look
into the history of England will find that the prerogative was always largest in the hands of our
wisest and best princes.” See id. (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT 160
(1698)).
29. STUDY, supra note 17, at 15 n.31.
30. See Neighbors, supra note 25, at 109 n.29 (“This theory has never been sanctioned
by the courts nor has any President suggested he was not bound by the Constitution.”).
31. See id. at 108.
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policy is the province of the legislative branch, and therefore, the
executive branch may only apply the policy that Congress sets for the
nation.32 The president may not contravene a statutory provision
or exceed the bounds of the legislation that delegated the power to
the executive.33 Congress may thus overrule an executive order with
legislation.34
C. Scope of Executive Orders
Executive orders are presidential directives that are directed to,
and govern actions of, officials and agencies of the executive
branch.35 As the director of the executive branch, the president pos-
sesses the power to issue instructions and orders to executive officers
concerning the performance of their duties.36 Usually, an executive
order only affects individual citizens indirectly.37 However, when an
executive order establishes national policy regarding how an entire
branch of the government should view the balance of state and na-
tional power, the entire nation may be affected. The Reagan Order
was the first order to set policy on federalism for the executive
branch. Yet the 1998 and 1999 Orders demonstrate that President
Clinton has tried, and failed, to leave his mark on federalism as well.
The following section briefly describes the Reagan Order and the
Clinton Orders on federalism.
III. INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERALISM ORDERS
A. The Reagan Order
The first executive order to establish the executive branch’s pol-
icy on federalism was President Reagan’s 1987 Order.38 It was
promulgated in light of the Reagan administration’s political doc-
32. See id. at 115 (relying in part on Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952)).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. The president may not, however, force department heads to either disregard federal
statutes, see Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 passim (1838), or
contravene public policy as determined by Congress, see Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 588.
37. See Cash, supra note 19, at 44.
38. The full text of the Reagan and Clinton orders are set forth in Appendices I, II, and
III of this Comment, respectively.
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trine of “new federalism,” or “a political doctrine that calls for radi-
cal downsizing of the federal government and the return of power to
the states.”39 The Reagan Order is marked by the belief that federal-
ism is best protected by limiting the size and scope of the federal
government,40 and that all powers not expressly enumerated to the
federal government are reserved to the states.41 It sets out clear tests
for when national action is appropriate42 and grants the states the
maximum administrative discretion possible.43
The Reagan Order also sets forth guidelines for when federal
preemption is appropriate,44 requiring the statute preempting the
state law to contain express language indicating that Congress in-
tended to preempt that state law.45 The burden of policing federal-
ism concerns rests within the regulating executive agencies who are
required to consult with state and local groups to avoid conflicts
between state and federal laws.46 Finally, a designated official in each
executive department ensures the implementation of the order.47 If
that official determines that proposed policies have federalism impli-
cations, a Federalism Assessment is to be created that contains an
analysis of implications and costs to states.48 In general, the Reagan
Order gives strong deference to the states and requires that great
measures be taken before state authority is preempted. The 1998
Order, however, attempted major changes to the basic principles set
forth in the Reagan Order.
B. The 1998 Order
President Clinton’s 1998 Order came as a surprise to almost eve-
ryone except the White House. On May 14, 1998, the Clinton ad-
ministration issued the order from Birmingham, England. As a mat-
39. Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the “New (New) Federal-
ism”: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 112 (1996) (footnote omit-
ted).
40. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 2(a).
41. See id. sec. 2(b).
42. See id. at 553, sec. (3)(b)(1)-(2).
43. See id. sec. (3)(c).
44. See id. sec. (4).
45. See id.
46. See id. sec. (4)(d).
47. See id. sec. (6)(a).
48. See id. at 554, sec. (6)(c)(1)-(3).
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ter of practice, the Clinton administration had worked in partnership
with state and local groups when proposed actions would affect their
interests. Both the Reagan administration and the Clinton admini-
stration actively worked with a group of state and local government
associations known as the “Big Seven”49 to create Reagan’s Order
and a previous Clinton order entitled “Enhancing the Intergovern-
mental Partnership.”50
In light of past experience, state and local groups were under-
standably surprised and upset when President Clinton signed the
1998 Order without consulting them.51 In response, the Big Seven
wrote a letter stating, “[n]o state and local government official was
consulted in the draftin[g] of [executive order] 13,083. In contrast,
this administration fully engaged state and local officials and their as-
sociations in the drafting of your [executive order] 12,875.”52 Lack
of consultation, coupled with the possible extreme influence the
1998 Order could have on state and local interests, inflamed state
and local government groups and incited them to take action to pre-
vent the Order from being implemented officially. In a letter dated
July 17, 1998, representatives of each of the seven groups requested
the new Order be withdrawn because no state or local government
officials had been consulted before the Order went into effect.53
The 1998 Order differed from the Reagan Order in many ways.
For example, the language of the Order mentioned nothing about
limiting the size of the federal government. Instead, it broadened the
49. The “Big Seven” consists of the National Governors’ Association, the National
Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, the National Association
of Counties, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National League of Cities, and the Interna-
tional City/County Management Association.
50. Exec. Order No. 12,875, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,093 (1993). See Clinton-Gore v. State
and Local Governments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l. Econ. Growth, Natural Re-
sources, and Regulatory Affairs of the Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. 2
(1998) (statement of Edward Rendell, Mayor of Philadelphia, on behalf of the U.S. Confer-
ence of Mayors) [hereinafter Hearing].
51. See Daniel Meisler, Clinton Postpones Executive Order, THE BOND BUYER (New
York), Sept. 23, 1998, at 4.
52. Letter from George V. Voinovich, Chairman, National Governors’ Association, et
al. to William J. Clinton, President of the United States 1 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Voino-
vich Letter]; see also Hearing, supra note 50, at 1-2 (statement of Dan Blue, N.C. House of
Rep., on behalf of the National Conference of State Legislatures) (stating “we are ‘mystified’
and ‘perplexed’ by our exclusion from the process leading up to the promulgation of E.O.
13,083,” and that “this is atypical of the way NCSL and state legislators have been dealt with
by this administration”).
53. See Voinovich Letter, supra note 52, at 1.
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scope of possible areas for regulation by adding a section that de-
tailed areas where federal action could be justified.54 Section 4 of the
1998 Order also seemed to broaden the federal government’s regu-
latory authority by removing any restrictions on regulations that had
federalism implications or imposed direct costs on states.55
In addition, the 1998 Order did not address when preemption
was appropriate.56 Although the 1998 Order created a waiver proce-
dure whereby states could apply for waiver of a regulatory require-
ment,57 this appears to have been a post-preemption remedy instead
of a protection of the balance between the states and the federal
government. In sum, the 1998 Order left the door open to an ex-
pansion of federal regulatory power that was not present under the
Reagan Order.
As a result, state and local groups revolted. On August 5, 1998,
President Clinton suspended the 1998 Order and the administration
agreed to put off drafting a new executive order indefinitely to allow
for consultation with state and local interest groups.58 In light of the
impeachment proceedings against the President in the House and
the resulting Senate trial, all official executive action on the 1998
Order was temporarily put aside. Eventually, however, the Clinton
administration drafted a new order.
C. The 1999 Order
After months of negotiations with state and local leaders, Presi-
dent Clinton issued the August 1999 Order superceding the 1998
Order, the Suspension Order, and the Reagan Order.59 Although the
1999 Order was meant to be “a compromise interpretation of the
state-federal roles outlined in the U.S. Constitution,”60 the new Or-
der appears suspiciously like the original Reagan Order.
The 1999 Order returns to most of the language found in the
54. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. (3)(d)(1)-(9) (prescribing nine
broad new areas that may warrant federal action).
55. See id. at 27,652-53, sec. (4)(b)(1)-(2).
56. Cf. Exec. Order 12,612, supra note 5, sec. (4)(a) (setting forth specific guidelines as
to when preemption is appropriate).
57. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. (5)(a).
58. See Exec. Order No. 13,095, supra note 8.
59. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, supra note 13, sec. (10)(a)-(b).
60. Judy Fahys, Clinton Cuts Deal With Governors, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 9, 1999, at
A1.
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Reagan Order concerning fundamental principles of federalism, fo-
cusing on the competence of the states to meet the needs of the
people,61 and disfavoring national policies.62 While it makes some
changes from the Reagan Order, the overwhelming majority of the
1999 Order is a strict return to President Reagan’s principles.
IV. DIRECT COMPARISON OF THE FEDERALISM ORDERS
The following is a comparison of the key issues raised by the
Reagan Order and 1998 and 1999 Clinton Orders on federalism.
For ease of reference, the full text of the orders appear in Appendix
A. In addition, a table containing a point-by-point comparison of the
exact language of each executive order is found in Appendix B. The
discussion below is divided into two categories: procedural require-
ments and substantive requirements.
A. Procedural Requirements
The Reagan Order’s procedural requirements concern four broad
areas: (1) the duty of federal agencies proposing regulations to fore-
see federalism implications and consult with state officials; (2) the
duty of federal agencies to appoint an official in charge of monitor-
ing federalism concerns and making a Federalism Assessment; (3) the
role of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); and (4) the
introduction of a new waiver procedure permitting states to be free
from compliance with federal regulations under certain circum-
stances. The 1998 Order attempted to delete the first three require-
ments, shifting the entire duty of monitoring federalism from the
federal government to the states. After conferencing with state and
local leaders, however, Clinton issued the 1999 Order, which not
only retained the state waiver provisions, but reinstated the Reagan
procedures as well.
1. The duty to foresee and consult
The Reagan Order required that when executive agencies or de-
partments were formulating and implementing policies that may
have federalism implications, the agencies were to take the following
steps: first, “[e]ncourage States to develop their own policies to
61. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, supra note 13, sec. (2)(e).
62. See id. at 43,256, sec. (2)(f).
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achieve program objectives”; second, “[r]efrain . . . from establishing
uniform, national standards” when possible; and finally, “[w]hen na-
tional standards are required, consult with the appropriate officials
and organizations representing the States.”63 All of these require-
ments were aimed at allowing states the first crack at finding solu-
tions to problems—even problems with a national scope.
The 1998 Order did not impose these same requirements on the
executive branch. The Order stated only that “[e]ach agency shall
have an effective process to permit elected officials and other repre-
sentatives of State and local governments to provide meaningful and
timely input in the development of regulatory policies that have fed-
eralism implications.”64 Although this requirement gave lip service to
consultation, it merely “permit[ed]” executive representatives to
make suggestions instead of placing a priority on allowing states to
first seek their own solutions. There was also no requirement in the
1998 Order that agencies refrain from the creation of national stan-
dards, although national standards, by definition, prevent states from
finding creative individual solutions to meet their specific needs.
The burden that was once on the executive branch to foresee
federalism concerns and consult with the states in the Reagan Order
shifted to the states in the 1998 Order. The 1998 Order did not
specify whether an agency must approach an affected state, or
whether it must only have a procedure whereby states may voice
their concerns upon their own initiative. The permissive language
suggested the latter. In fact, upon close inspection, the language of
the 1998 Order did not even require that there be actual consulta-
tion, only that there be a process whereby states may give input in
the development of federal policies.65
The 1999 Order clearly returns the duty to consult with the
states to the executive branch. It states that “[w]hen undertaking to
formulate and implement policies that have federalism implications,
agencies shall . . . consult with appropriate State and local officials.”66
63. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 3(d)(1)-(3).
64. Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. 4(a).
65. See id. (“Each agency shall have an effective process to permit elected officials and
other representatives of State and local governments to provide meaningful and timely input in
the development of regulatory policies that have federalism implications.”).
66. Exec. Order No. 13,132, supra note 13, sec. 3(d) (emphasis added). Similarly, sec-
tion 4(d) of the Reagan Order states,
As soon as an Executive department or agency foresees the possibility of a conflict
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The 1999 Order, then, reverts back to the Reagan Order’s language
and requires consultation before any action limiting the policymak-
ing authority of the states is taken.67 Thus, the 1999 Order reenacts
the consultation provisions of the Reagan Order, including the duty
to consult with appropriate state representatives “in determining
whether to establish uniform national standards,” trying to identify
alternatives to uniform standards, and developing such standards
when required.68 This once again vests executive agencies with the
duty to consult when attempting to regulate within the states’ realm,
and implicitly requires that executive agencies be mindful of federal-
ism concerns when attempting to regulate. In the 1998 Order, the
White House attempted to broaden their ability to set national stan-
dards without consulting states and providing the states the oppor-
tunity to meet the federal objective in their own narrowly-tailored
way. The states countered this attack and regained those procedural
safeguards in the 1999 Order.
2. An official in charge of monitoring federalism concerns and the
Federalism Assessment
The Reagan Order provided that the head of each executive de-
partment was to designate an official in that department who was to
ensure the implementation of the order’s federalism assessment pro-
cedures.69 Under section 6(b), this federalism official was to deter-
mine whether a proposed policy had sufficient federalism implica-
tions to warrant preparation of a “Federalism Assessment,” which
would analyze the burdens any regulation would impose on state or
local government.70 The assessment was to be used in all decisions
regarding promulgating or implementing any policy and was to be
submitted to the OMB along with a report listing any inconsistencies
with the executive order, or any additional costs or burdens that
between State law and Federally protected interests within its area of regulatory re-
sponsibility, the department or agency shall consult, to the extent practicable, with
appropriate officials and organizations representing the States in an effort to avoid
such a conflict.
Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. (4)(d).
67. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, supra note 13, sec. 3(a).
68. Id. sec. 3(d)(1)-(4).
69. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 6(a).
70. See id. sec. 6(b).
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might be placed on the affected states.71 The Federalism Assessment
requirement acted to protect state sovereignty.
In contrast, the closest the 1998 Order came to requiring a Fed-
eralism Assessment was to state that regulations passed pursuant to
such an assessment are not prohibited.72 The Order provided, among
other things, that regulations were not prohibited where (1) funds
can be “provided by the Federal Government,” and (2) “the
agency . . . provides to the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget a description of the extent of the agency’s prior consul-
tation with representatives of affected States,” the reasoning for the
regulation, and “any written communications submitted to the
agency by States or local governments.”73
These exceptions have no analogue in the Reagan Order. While
the 1998 Order’s requirements could be roughly characterized as a
Federalism Assessment equivalent, the 1998 Order did not directly
require that agencies designate an official to specifically monitor fed-
eralism concerns or conduct an assessment of the federalism implica-
tions of their proposed regulations as the Reagan Order had done.
As a result, many believe that the 1998 Order “ ‘stripped the most
basic protection accorded the states, the preparation of a Federalism
Assessment,’ which required agencies to analyze the burdens any
new regulation imposed on state and local governments.”74 In his
testimony before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs,
Ernest Gellhorn suggested that such a requirement be placed in a
Senate bill codifying policy on federalism.75 He reasoned that “forc-
ing such an assessment by agencies can make agencies sensitive to
federalism concerns and lead to more rational and reasonable
rules.”76
The 1999 Order reinstates some of the safeguards that were de-
leted by the 1998 Order. Section 6(a) of the 1999 Order requires
that “the head of each agency shall designate an official with princi-
71. See id. at 554, sec. 6(c)(1)-(4).
72. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. 4(b)(1), (2)(a)-(b).
73. Id. at 27,653.
74. Broder, supra note 6, at A15 (quoting Rep. David M. McIntosh, a subcommittee
chairman on the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight).
75. See Regulation of Federal Preemption of State Laws: Hearings on S. 1214 Before the
Senate Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999), available in WESTLAW at 1999 WL
503733 (statement of Ernest Gellhorn, Professor of Law, George Mason University).
76. Id.
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pal responsibility for the agency’s implementation of this order.”77 In
section 6(b)(2)(B), in a separately identified portion of the preamble
to the regulation as it is to be issued, an agency must create a “feder-
alism summary impact statement, which consists of a description of
prior consultation with State and local officials, a summary of the
nature of their concerns” as well as the agency’s reasons for wanting
to regulate, “and a statement of the extent to which the concerns of
State and local officials have been met.”78 In section 6(b)(2)(C), the
order again stresses that no agency shall promulgate any regulation
that has federalism implications and that preempts state law, unless
the agency has first consulted with the states in developing the pro-
posed regulation, made the federalism summary impact statement,
and reported to the OMB all communications from state agencies.79
3. The OMB’s role
Another requirement contained in the Reagan Order but omit-
ted in the Clinton 1998 Order concerns the role of the OMB.80 The
OMB was put in charge of “ ‘central clearance’ over program devel-
opment by the executive agencies,” as well as preparation and sub-
mission of the executive budget to Congress.81 Under the Reagan
Order, the OMB was required to take affirmative action to assure
that the policies of executive agencies and departments were consis-
tent with the principles and requirements of the executive order.82
The 1998 Order did not specifically state that it would continue
to require this of the OMB. Therefore, if policy had formally been
set pursuant to the 1998 Order, there would have been no oversight
by the OMB, thus effectively shifting the entire burden to monitor
federalism concerns to the states. This lack of protection would have
left state and local governments extremely vulnerable, rendering it
impossible for any state or local organization to practically track all
executive action on its own. Thus, executive agencies would have
been free to regulate as they pleased.
77. Exec. Order No. 13,132, supra note 13, sec. 6(a).
78. Id. at 43,258, sec. 6(b)(1)(B).
79. See id.
80. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 7(a).
81. RAYMOND TATALOVICH & BYRON W. DAYNES, PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES 231 (1984).
82. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 7(a).
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The 1999 Order, however, explicitly reinstates the OMB’s role
in policing federalism concerns. Section 8(a) of the 1999 Order re-
quires that each agency submit to the OMB drafts of any final regu-
lation that has federalism implications.83 Before doing so, the agency
official in charge of federalism concerns is to first certify that the re-
quirements of the 1999 Order have been followed.84 In addition, the
1999 Order requires the OMB to confer with the Assistant to the
President for Intergovernmental Affairs to ensure that the 1999 Or-
der is being implemented.85 Thus, the role of the OMB has been
clarified and even strengthened in the new Order. Agencies must be
responsible for their own policing of federalism concerns, but the
OMB acts as a gatekeeper, requiring certification from government
officials before any further action may be taken.
4. Waiver provision
Finally, the Clinton 1998 Order tried to create a new procedure
that had no analogue in the Reagan Order, whereby an affected state
could obtain a waiver from federal regulations provided that the
state’s own regulations satisfy federal policy or objectives. Section 5
of the 1998 Order instructed agencies to review and streamline their
waiver processes, and “to the extent practicable and permitted by
law,” review all applications for waiver and render a timely decision
and explanation of that decision.86
The process of obtaining waiver was intended to allow national
objectives to be met while still tending to the unique needs of the
individual states.87 Both state and local officials recognized the bene-
fit of having a waiver provision:
Our federal systems will always need fine-tuning to keep them re-
sponsive to the people. As each Congress enacts new laws, it must
also protect the vitality of state and local governments to deliver
effective services. The multiple programs for similar activities in
education, training, welfare, health care, and the environment can-
83. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, supra note 13, sec. 8(a).
84. See id. sec. 8(b).
85. See id. at 43,259, sec. 8(c).
86. Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. 5(b)-(c).
87. See Streamlining Federal Grant Waivers to States: Hearing on H.R. 2376 Before the
House Committee on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. (1999), available in WESTLAW at 1999 WL
27595152 [hereinafter Streamlining] (statement of Raymond C. Sheppach, on behalf of the
National Governors’ Association).
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not be properly coordinated without an effective waiver process.
Waivers are always needed not only to meet the unique needs of
each state, but are key to stimulating new innovations at the state
and local levels.88
Yet because the duty to foresee, consult, and allow states to find
their own solutions was so weak in the 1998 Order,89 waiver might
have permitted federal agencies to sidestep actual consultation with
the states, undermining potential state benefits.
The 1999 Order contains waiver provisions identical to the 1998
Order. However, the 1999 Order’s requirement that agencies con-
sult states before drafting regulations permits states to use the waiver
process as an additional means of avoiding national standards rather
than merely a post-implementation form of relief.
5. Procedural conclusions
The Reagan Order contained procedural safeguards that insured
that the federal government did not encroach on state authority. The
Clinton 1998 Order would have shifted the burden of policing fed-
eralism concerns to state and local governments by removing the
procedural safeguards in the Reagan Order. With the enactment of
the 1999 Order, however, the responsibility of monitoring federal-
ism concerns returns to executive agencies that may be trying to limit
state power through federal regulation.
B. Substantive Requirements
The three federalism orders also vary in their substantive re-
quirements. The key substantive issues addressed by the orders are:
(1) the scope of federal and local sovereignty preemption, (2) what
constitutes issues of national scope, and (3) costs to the taxpayer.
1. Shift from the focus on state sovereignty
a. Presumption of state sovereignty. The hallmark of the Reagan
Order was its repeated emphasis on the idea that, in the absence of a
clear constitutional or statutory provision delegating authority to the
federal government, sovereignty was presumed to rest with the indi-
vidual states, and any uncertainties were to be resolved against regu-
88. Id.
89. See supra Part III.B.
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lation at the national level.90 Although the Clinton 1998 Order ac-
knowledged some deference to the states and their power to govern
locally on a range of issues,91 the emphasis on state sovereignty was
not as prevalent as in the Reagan Order.
With the enactment of the 1999 Order, however, most of the
language of the Reagan Order was restored, if not strengthened. For
example, section 3(c) of the Reagan Order stated that the national
government “should grant the states the maximum administrative
discretion possible,”92 while the 1999 Order states that the national
government “shall” grant the States discretion.93 Small semantic
changes throughout the 1999 Order such as this reaffirm the pre-
sumption of state power.
b. Fundamental principle of federalism. The Reagan Order’s
statement of federalism philosophy reads: “Federalism is rooted in
the knowledge that our political liberties are best assured by limiting
the size and scope of the national government.”94 In contrast, the
1998 Order stated as its first premise: “The structure of government
established by the Constitution is premised upon a system of checks
and balances.”95 While the first fundamental principle of the Reagan
Order spoke directly to the size and scope of the federal govern-
ment,96 the 1998 Order spoke to a system of checks and balances,
with no mention of size.97 The 1999 Order changes the focus yet
again by mandating that all questions not national in scope be left to
90. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 2(i).
91. For example, Section 2(b) of Executive Order 12,612 states,
The people of the States created the national government when they delegated
to it those enumerated governmental powers relating to matters beyond the com-
petence of the individual States. All other sovereign powers, save those expressly
prohibited the States by the Constitution, are reserved to the States or to the peo-
ple.
Id. sec. (2)(b). The executive order demonstrates a clear deference to the States and their
power to govern locally. For specific examples, see Executive Order 13,083 at section 2(g)
(stating that “[p]olicies of the Federal Government should recognize the responsibility of” and
should encourage opportunities for “States” to achieve the necessary objectives through a co-
operative effort) and section 3(a) (stating that the necessity for Federal action that would limit
the policy making discretion of States and local governments should be carefully assessed).
92. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 3(c).
93. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, supra note 13, sec. 3(c).
94. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 2(a).
95. Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. 2(a).
96. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 2(a).
97. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. 2(a).
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the state and local governments.98
While the 1998 Order did not specifically state that it attempted
to enlarge the size or scope of regulatory powers granted to execu-
tive departments and agencies, a change in attitude was apparent in
light of the removal of most of the Reagan Order’s procedural re-
quirements discussed above that acted as a check on the authority of
executive agencies.99 While most of the procedural requirements are
returned in the 1999 Order, the 1999 Order contains no language
limiting the size and scope of the national government similar to
section 2(a) of the Reagan Order. This is one of the few concessions
the Clinton camp seems to have won.
2. Preemption
The doctrine of preemption is that “if a properly adopted federal
law conflicts with a state law, then under the Supremacy Clause, fed-
eral law trumps state law.”100 Many view federal preemption as “the
number one assault on the powers and authority returned by the
states and local governments throughout the Constitution.”101 The
Reagan Order gave executive agencies guidance on when preemp-
tion is appropriate, but the 1998 Order did not.
The Reagan Order included a section specifically devoted to pre-
emption that established when federal law could take the place of a
state or local government’s judgment.102 It required executive agen-
cies to construe,
in regulations and otherwise, a Federal statute to preempt State law
only when the statute contains an express preemption provision or
there is some other firm and palpable evidence compelling the con-
clusion that the Congress intended preemption of State law, or
when the exercise of State authority directly conflicts with the exer-
cise of Federal authority under the Federal statute.103
98. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, supra note 13, sec. 2(a).
99. See supra Part IV.A.
100. Regulation of Federal Preemption of State Laws: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the Senate
Gov’t. Affairs Comm., 106th Cong. (1999), available in WESTLAW at 1999 WL 503738
(statement of Rep. John Dorso, Majority Leader N.D. House of Rep.) [hereinafter Federal
Preemption].
101. See id. (statement of Daniel M. Sprague, Executive Director and on behalf of the
Council of State Governments).
102. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 4.
103. Id. sec. 4(a).
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Otherwise, there must have been firm and palpable evidence that
Congress intended to delegate to the department or agency the
authority to issue regulations preempting state law, and agencies
were required to consult with the appropriate state officials and make
the regulation as narrow as possible.104
The 1998 Order contained no guidance on preemption issues,
making it unclear when executive regulation should preempt state
law.105 The abandonment of the clear limitations on preemption that
did exist would have enlarged the range of federal regulation under
the 1998 Order merely because there was no guidance to tell agen-
cies they could not preempt.
The 1999 Order returns preemption guidance with a slightly
weakened standard. Section 4(a) of the Reagan Order provided that
preemption was only available when there was a clear statutory “pre-
emption provision or there is some other firm and palpable evidence
compelling the conclusion that the Congress intended preemption
of State law.”106 The 1999 Order provides for preemption only
“where . . . there is some other clear evidence that the Congress in-
tended preemption of State law.”107 Although this appears to weaken
the standard, the 1999 Order at least gives guidance on when pre-
emption is appropriate, whereas the 1998 Order gave none.
3. The problem of national scope
The Reagan Order stated: “Federal action limiting the policy-
making discretion of the States should be taken only where constitu-
tional authority for the action is clear and certain and the national
activity is necessitated by the presence of a problem of national
scope.”108 It then set forth the following three-prong test for deter-
mining whether the authority is clear and certain: (1) “authority for
the action may be found in a specific provision of the Constitution,
(2) there is no provision in the Constitution prohibiting Federal ac-
tion, and (3) the action does not encroach upon authority reserved
to the States.”109
104. See id. sec. 4(b)-(e).
105. Preemption is addressed in Section 4 of the Reagan Order. See Appendix A.
106. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 4(a).
107. Exec. Order No. 13,132, supra note 13, sec. 4(a).
108. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 3(b).
109. Id. sec. 3(b)(2).
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In comparison, the Clinton 1998 Order read, “Agencies may
limit the policymaking discretion of States and local governments
only after determining that there is constitutional and legal authority
for the action.”110 No clear and certain showing of authority was re-
quired, no standard was given, and the impression was that agencies
could freely limit state and local policymaking. This implication is
perhaps the 1998 Order’s most dangerous change from the Reagan
Order. The line between matters of national scope, or multistate
scope, would have been blurred. Although what is a matter of na-
tional scope is admittedly an area of ongoing and intense debate, the
Reagan Order at least provided a standard and some guidelines for
agencies to follow as limitations on the executive agencies’ power.
In addition to weakening the standard, the 1998 Order tried to
identify nine new areas the executive branch deemed national in
scope. Without a national scope standard, these nine categories pos-
sibly would have opened the door to unexpected regulations. Those
nine instances include:
(1) When the matter to be addressed by Federal action occurs in-
terstate as opposed to being contained within one State’s bounda-
ries.
(2) When the source of the matter to be addressed occurs in a State
different from the State (or States) where a significant amount of
the harm occurs.
(3) When there is a need for uniform national standards.
(4) When decentralization increases the costs of government thus
imposing additional burdens on the taxpayer.
(5) When States have not adequately protected individual rights
and liberties.
(6) When States would be reluctant to impose necessary regulations
because of fears that regulated business activity will relocate to
other States.
(7) When placing regulatory authority at the State or local level
would undermine regulatory goals because high costs or demands
110. Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. 3(b).
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for specialized expertise will effectively place the regulatory matter
beyond the resources of State authorities.
(8) When the matter relates to Federally owned or managed prop-
erty or natural resources, trust obligations, or intentional obliga-
tions.
(9) When the matter to be regulated significantly or uniquely af-
fects Indian tribal governments.111
Use of presidential power such as this presents problems when
there is no clear constitutional or congressional base for a particular
order.112 A closer examination of these nine categories provides
helpful insight into what power the president might have been at-
tempting to gain through this new provision in the 1998 Order.
a. Matters of multistate scope. Subparts one and two both speci-
fied that it is important to recognize the distinction between matters
of national or multistate scope that may justify federal action and
matters that are merely common to the states.113 Subparts one and
two of the 1998 Order dealt with when the matter to be addressed
occurs interstate (as opposed to intrastate), and when the source of
the matter to be addressed occurs in a state (or states) different from
the state where a significant amount of the harm occurs.114 The 1998
Order attempted to make a distinction between matters that are
merely common to states,115 but it contained no standard to identify
when a matter is common to the states or when the matter is of na-
tional scope. There was no standard to guide when these two situa-
tions set forth are genuine issues of multistate scope. The 1998 Or-
der created a looser analysis for matters of multistate scope, where
111. Id. sec. 3(d).
112. Ronald Turner notes,
A baseless and unauthorized order provides a means for the President to sub-
vert the system of checks and balances, for she can make laws free from congres-
sional involvement or agreement and is “able to make sweeping policy value choices
without any check by either the federal courts or by a majority of Congress.”
Ronald Turner, Banning the Permanent Replacement of Strikers by Executive Order: The Con-
flict Between Executive Order 12,954 and the NLRA, 12 J.L. & Pol. 1, 5-6 (1996) (quoting
Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV.
23, 71 (1995)).
113. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. 3(d); Exec. Order No. 12,612, su-
pra note 5, sec. 3(b)(1).
114. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. 3(d)(1-2).
115. See id.
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the Reagan Order tried to craft the smallest exception possible, and
had a distinct bias against national regulations. In essence, the 1998
Order could have broadened the jurisdiction of executive agencies to
permit legislation in areas that had, until then, been considered the
province of the states.
b. Matters burdening states with costs. Subparts four, six, and
seven of the Clinton 1998 Order all dealt with situations in which
additional costs would be placed on the taxpayer. These circum-
stances included: (1) when decentralization placed extra financial
burdens on the taxpayers,116 (2) when states chose to forego neces-
sary regulations for fear of losing business to other states,117 and (3)
when giving regulatory authority to state or local government “un-
dermine[d] regulatory goals because high costs . . . for specialized
expertise . . . effectively place[d] the regulatory matter beyond the
resources of State authorities.”118 In all of these situations, cost was
the determining factor instead of genuine federalism concerns. A
cost-benefit analysis should no doubt be one factor in determining
what should be a legitimate issue of multistate scope. Yet, as a matter
of public policy, Congress should be the branch of government that
decides which issues should be addressed by national instead of state
governments.
Justice Harlan once said, “ ‘That Congress cannot delegate leg-
islative power to the President’ . . . ‘is a principle universally recog-
nized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of gov-
ernment ordained by the Constitution.’ ”119 Congress may indeed
delegate authority to execute an act of Congress to the executive
branch if it deems a certain function more properly suited to that
branch of government. However, without that specific grant of
authority, the executive branch could begin to legislate and destroy
the balance between local issues and matters of national scope when
it is the body that decides what matters are of national scope. It is
the president’s job to carry out the laws passed by Congress,120 not
the other way around.
116. See id. sec. 3(d)(4).
117. See id. sec. 3(d)(5).
118. Id. sec. 3(d)(7).
119. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 146
(Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (quoting Justice Harlan).
120. See MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 239 (1977).
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In addition, many of the areas the 1998 Order identified as be-
ing of national scope bordered on areas of traditional state or legisla-
tive functions.121 For example, business regulation is a traditional
state function, yet the 1998 Order would have allowed agencies to
regulate quite broadly in this area.122 The executive agency would
have dictated regulations “necessary . . . because of fears that regu-
lated business activity will relocate to other States.”123
Furthermore, the meaning of the language of the 1998 Order
allowing federal regulation “[w]hen States have not adequately pro-
tected individual rights and liberties” is unclear.124 One plausible in-
terpretation is that this language was intended to broaden the scope
of federal power in areas such as health care, education, welfare, tra-
ditional family life and values, and many other areas traditionally
governed by individual states. Such an interpretation, if accurate,
would have drastically changed the balance of power between state
and federal governments.
However, the question of what the 1998 Order’s nine categories
would have meant for federalism policy is now moot because the
White House’s attempt to broaden the concept of a “problem of na-
tional scope” failed. In the 1999 Order, the nine categories are
eliminated in favor of broad directives that encourage the states to
work with agencies to develop their own policies, deferring to states
to establish their own standards, and consulting before and after na-
tional policy is set.125
c. Matters requiring national standards. Finally, there is a direct
conflict between the Reagan Order and section 3(d)(3) of the 1998
Order. The Reagan Order states in section 3(d)(2) that executive
departments and agencies should “[r]efrain . . . from establishing
uniform, national standards for programs and, when possible,
[should] defer to the States to establish standards.”126 Section
3(d)(3) of the 1998 Order would allow for preemption “when there
is a need for uniform national standards.”127 Section 3(d)(2) of the
Reagan Order does not forbid the establishing of national standards,
121. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 3(b)(1).
122. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
123. Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. 3(d)(6).
124. Id. sec. 3(d)(5).
125. See id. sec. 3(d)(1)-(4).
126. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. 3(d)(2).
127. Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. 3(d)(3).
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but it strongly advises against it and requires executive agencies to
defer to the states whenever possible. In contrast, section 3(d)(3) of
the 1998 Order does not require deference to the states when estab-
lishing national standards but merely states a preference to defer to
states “where possible.”128
The 1999 Order is different than the Reagan Order in that it
lacks the Reagan Order’s language requiring that federal agencies
“[r]efrain, to the maximum extent possible, from establishing uni-
form, national standards,”129 and it does not apply the three-part test
for determining when there is a problem of national scope.130 How-
ever, the 1999 Order does provide that when there is a question as
to whether an issue is of national scope, agencies “shall consult with
appropriate State and local officials to determine whether Federal
objectives can be obtained by other means.”131 This is perhaps an
even more favorable outcome for state officials than what the Reagan
Order provided, in that it again mandates consultation. With greater
interaction between agencies and state and local officials, matters of
national scope will become easier to identify, or at least compromises
can be made as to what level of government should handle certain
issues.
4. Regulations imposing additional costs on taxpayers
Sections in both the 1998 and 1999 Clinton Orders potentially
broaden executive regulatory power based on costs as well. Both
sections are substantially the same:
To the extent practicable and permitted by law, no agency shall
promulgate any regulation that is not required by statute, that has
federalism implications, and that imposes substantial direct compli-
ance costs on States and local governments, unless:
(1) funds necessary to pay the direct costs incurred by the State
or local government in complying with the regulation are provided
by the Federal Government; or
(2) the agency, prior to the formal promulgation of the regula-
128. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, supra note 13, sec. 3(d)(2).
129. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 5, sec. (3)(d)(2).
130. See id. sec. 3(b)(1)-(2).
131. Exec. Order No. 13,132, supra note 13, sec. 3(b).
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tion,
(A) in a separately identified portion of the preamble to the
regulation as it is to be issued in the Federal Register, provides to
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget a descrip-
tion of the extent of the agency’s prior consultation with represen-
tatives of affected States and local governments, a summary of the
nature of their concerns, and the agency’s position supporting the
need to issue the regulation; and
(B) makes available to the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget any written communications submitted to the
agency by States or local governments.132
Potentially, the federal government paying for the states’ costs in
implementing the federal regulation would have made regulations
possible that would have otherwise been unacceptable. The Reagan
Order made no mention of condoning regulation that might other-
wise overstep the states’ right to self-government simply by picking
up the tab. In the past, the struggle between the federal government
and state and local groups has been over the issuance of unfunded
mandates.133 But this type of exception, found in both the 1998 and
1999 Orders, could allow for regulation that deeply threatens the
separation of powers under the guise of a funded mandate. It is also
unclear whether this exception’s purpose is to protect the states fi-
nancially, or only to broaden the scope of potential federal regula-
tion. Consequently, it is unclear what this provision will mean in the
future to executive agencies or to the states.
5. Substantive conclusions
The 1998 Order would have made significant substantive
changes to Reagan’s federalism policy. Specifically, the 1998 Order
lacked the Reagan Order’s dedication to principles of state sover-
eignty and some of the clear guidelines that once governed executive
regulations, such as Federalism Assessments. Yet the 1999 Order re-
pairs what harm was done and, in some cases, strengthens the states’
position.
132. Id. sec. 6(b)(1)-(2); Exec. Order No. 13,083, supra note 4, sec. 4(b)(1-2) (empha-
sis altered).
133. See generally Steinzor, supra note 39.
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V. FEDERALISM IN THE EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND JUDICIAL
BRANCHES
A. Executive Branch
The events of the past year have proven that federalism is indeed
not “a substitute for a sleeping pill,”134 but rather a matter of vital
interest in every branch of federal government. The clear conclusion
that can be drawn from the above comparison of the Reagan Order
and the Clinton 1998 and 1999 Orders is that at this time, the states
have the upper hand over the executive branch on federalism policy.
The Clinton administration attempted to greatly broaden its regula-
tory power in the 1998 Order, but the states prevailed in the 1999
Order by restoring—and even strengthening—the federalism princi-
ples set forth in the Reagan Order.
Ironically, before the introduction of the 1998 Order, the
Reagan Order had been largely ignored. L. Nye Stevens testified
before the Senate Committee on Government Reform “that Execu-
tive Order 12,612 had not been implemented to any significant ex-
tent by the Reagan Administration ‘or its successors.’ ”135 In addi-
tion, the OMB had taken little action to ensure that the principles of
federalism outlined by the 1987 Order were actually implemented.136
Consequently, it seems strange that an older order, so little used,
would garner such passionate support.
Perhaps the current burgeoning interest in federalism stems from
a growing feeling among state and local interest groups that there
has been a substantial “power shift,” resulting in the diminished
authority of state legislatures. In a statement made before the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee, John Dorso testified on behalf of
the National Conference of State Legislatures regarding the pro-
posed Federalism Accountability Act of 1999. He claimed “that the
frequency and intrusiveness of federal preemption has increased dra-
matically.”137 Dorso continued,
As we all know, if a properly adopted federal law conflicts with a
134. See Clinton, supra, note 1 and accompanying text.
135. Federal Preemption, supra note 100 (statement of L. Nye Stevens, Director, Federal
Management and Workforce Issues, General Government Division).
136. See id.
137. Id. (statement of Rep. John Dorso, Majority Leader N.D. House of Rep.).
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state law, then under the Supremacy Clause, federal law trumps
state law. Through most of the history of our republic, the federal
government used its preemption power sparingly. Congress and
federal agencies showed respect for the American tradition that
government should be kept close to the people and that most pub-
lic policy decisions should be made locally. This is no longer the
case.
The Problem Generally: An Advisory Commission on Intergov-
ernmental Relations study of a few years ago documented that
most of the federal preemption of state law through the history of
the republic has taken place since 1970. In the 1990s, the pace of
preemption has quickened, and the impact of preemption is not
merely trivial or incidental. As a result of preemption, states have
been barred in the 1990s from legislating in policy areas of great
importance.
I call it the great power shift. The authority of America’s state
legislatures is shrinking. This is bad not only for state legislatures
but also for the American people, who are increasingly deprived of
effective local self-government.138
Whatever the reasons for this current resurgence, it is clear that
federalism is an important issue to most state and national officials.
Whether the federalism debate will have an impact on daily practice
or remain a matter of purely academic, ideological concern remains
to be seen. It is clear, however, that at this point the states have
control over the executive branch’s handling of federalism concerns.
The commotion instigated by the 1998 Clinton Order demon-
strated that setting policy on federalism in the executive branch was a
topic worthy of national debate, even though the scope of the ex-
ecutive orders is relatively small. The 1999 Clinton Order governs
only the executive branch and cannot dictate this view to other
branches of the government. Therefore, it is also worthwhile to look
briefly at what is happening on other fronts.
B. Legislative Branch
Clarence Anthony, President of the National League of Cities, in
a letter to President Clinton, remarked, “It is only by addressing fed-
eralism concerns with all branches of government that a true federal,
138. Id.
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state, and local partnership can be achieved.”139 In addition to the
wrangling in the executive branch over the executive orders on fed-
eralism, both Congress and the Supreme Court are addressing this
issue as well.
In the 106th Congress, the Federalism Act of 1999 in the House
(“H.R. 2245”), and the Federalism Accountability Act of 1999 in
the Senate (“S. 1214”), would make many of the same requirements
that the 1999 Order makes mandatory on the executive branch and
its agencies binding on the legislature as well as the executive branch.
It has thus been suggested that policy in the executive branch has
only been temporarily settled with the issuance of the 1999 Order.140
In support of the Senate bill, Daniel M. Sprague testified,
Passage of S. 1214 is essential to State and Local Governments
for the 21st Century
-This bill will protect the principles of federalism and promote
intergovernmental partnerships, which are they key to successful
governance in the United States; -This bill places the same re-
quirements on both the Administrative and Legislative branches of
federal government and requires that state and local governments
be consulted in advance of passage of legislation or issuance of
regulations that would preempt state or local government author-
ity; -This bill codifies existing federal Executive Orders that would
require federalism assessments to identify preemptions and the ex-
tent of preemptions by both Administrative agencies and the Con-
gress when proposing regulation or bills . . . .141
One reason for codifying federalism provisions is to make them
judicially enforceable. Because executive orders are not laws, they
create no rights and are not judicially enforceable. Testifying on be-
half of the National League of Cities, Alexander G. Fekete stated,
“In sum, from a public policy perspective, an executive order sup-
porting federalism is helpful in providing guidance on the issue, but
it simply does not carry the same weight as legislation.”142 Professor
139. Becker, supra note 16, at 6.
140. See Hearing, supra note 50, at 109-23 (statement of Daniel T. Blue, N.C. House of
Rep.).
141. Federal Preemption, supra note 100 (statement of Daniel M. Sprague, Executive
Director and on behalf of the Council of State Governments).
142. Id. (statement of Alexander G. Fekete, Mayor of Pembroke Pines, Florida, on behalf
of the National League of Cities).
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Ernest Gellhorn, professor of law at George Mason University, testi-
fied to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, “where such
policies are not enforced by judicial review, as illustrated by Execu-
tive Order 12,612 (on federalism) . . . which [was] uniformly ig-
nored by the agencies, agency compliance is problematical and
probably unlikely.”143 An act of Congress, which could be judicially
enforced, would strengthen the effect of the principles of separation
of power in a way that the 1999 Order cannot, since the Order is
only binding on agencies within the executive branch.
The same parties who negotiated the 1999 Order with the White
House are now focusing on these bills before Congress.144 In the
words of Raymond Sheppach on behalf of the National Governors’
Association, “[t]he Governors are committed to a revitalized and
strong partnership with Congress and the administration to bring a
new balance to federalism.”145
C. Judicial Branch
During 1999, the United States Supreme Court issued three de-
cisions dealing with federalism, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educa-
tion Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,146 Alden v. Maine,147 and
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Ex-
pense Board.148 In these cases, the Court held that states cannot be
sued in state or federal court for violations of federal law unless the
state waives its sovereign immunity.149 Thus, a national spotlight has
turned to focus on the Supreme Court’s current approach to feder-
alism issues—an approach that appears to favor state sovereignty.
During the present 1999-2000 Term, the Supreme Court is
143. Id. (statement of Ernest Gellhorn, Professor of Law, George Mason University)
(pointing out that the S. 1214 would create full judicial review under the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act but supporting more limited judicial review).
144. See Federal Preemption, supra note 100 (statement of Daniel T. Blue, N.C. House of
Rep. on behalf of the National Conference of State Legislatures) (stating that representative of
the National Conference of State Legislators, now testifying on behalf of H.R. 2245, testified
last year in regard to the 1998 Order).
145. See Streamlining, supra note 87 (statement of Raymond C. Sheppach, on behalf of
the National Governors’ Association).
146. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
147. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
148. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
149. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2202; College Savings, 119 S. Ct. at 2233; Alden,
119 S. Ct. at 2246.
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slated to hear additional cases with federalism overtones.150 Many
Supreme Court observers have noted that one of the Rehnquist
Court’s leading contributions to constitutional jurisprudence “has
been a series of decisions reining in federal intrusion on state
authority.”151 One columnist recently stated,
The Supreme Court is controlled today by justices who avoid
bold strokes and resist rulings that would dramatically reinterpret
the nation’s laws. But one area remains an exception: the boundary
between the powers of federal government and the states.
A resolute five-justice majority in recent years has been shoring
up the authority of the states at the expense of Congress. And
during oral arguments Wednesday in an important test on where
the proper balance lies, this majority appeared poised to deepen its
imprint in favor of states’ rights over federal authority.152
The Court has already handed down two decisions in January of
2000 dealing directly with the disputed boundary between state and
national control. The first, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,153 held
that, although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
does contain a clear statement of Congress’ intent to abrogate the
States’ immunity to suits by private individuals claiming age dis-
crimination, that abrogation exceeded Congress’s authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the
Constitution permits states to draw lines on the basis of age if they
have a rational basis for doing so at a class-based level.154
In the second federalism decision, Reno v. Condon,155 the Court
held that in enacting the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994,
which regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in
the records of state motor vehicle departments, Congress did not run
150. See Shaw, supra note 2, at A4.
151. Olson, supra note 2, at A43; see also Biskupic, High Court, supra note 2, at A3 (“To
date, the Rehnquist court’s legacy has been to curb Congress’s authority to pass laws that ad-
dress traditionally local concerns, such as gun control, and to protect states from lawsuits based
on federal rights, as in the case of a ruling last term that prevented state employees from suing
the states for overtime wages they were entitled to under federal labor law.”).
152. Biskupic, National Court Support, supra note 2, at A19; see also Biskupic, High
Court, supra note 2, at A3.
153. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
154. See id. at 648.
155. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
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afoul of the federalism principles enunciated in Printz.156 First, the
regulation was made pursuant to the Commerce Clause, and second,
the Act does not require the states in their sovereign capacity to
regulate their own citizens but regulates the States as the owners of
the databases.157 Although upholding the regulation, the Court spe-
cifically clarified:
[T]he DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign ca-
pacity to regulate their own citizens. . . . It does not require the
South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it
does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of fed-
eral statutes regulating private individuals.158
Still remaining this term is whether Congress exceeded its
authority with the 1994 Violence Against Women Act, which allows
women who have been raped, stalked, or otherwise assaulted to sue
their attackers.159 Thus, as cases continue to follow the framework set
out in Florida Prepaid, College Savings, and Alden, the states are re-
ceiving another federalism boon. So while the debate over federalism
in the executive branch has been temporarily settled, it is far from
disappearing in both the legislature and the judiciary. In fact, the
months to come hold great potential for fine-tuning.
VI. CONCLUSION
The separation of powers between federal, state, and local
governments has traditionally been an area of great controversy.
Where the division of power is to be drawn, as a practical matter, has
the potential to change with every new president or new Congress.
Before the promulgation of the 1999 Order, when the broad 1998
Order was to be implemented, some doomsayers argued that if Y2K
were to cause crucial computers to crash and precipitate a national
emergency, President Clinton would “be ready [with his 1998 Order
on federalism] to assume emergency dictatorial powers that no
American president has ever had before.”160 Senator Robert Bennett,
from Utah, asked the United States military to be ready to respond if
156. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
157. See Condon, 120 S. Ct. at 671-72.
158. Id. at 672.
159. See Biskupic, High Court, supra note 2, at A3.
160. Phyllis Schlafly, Grabbing Vast New Powers via Executive Order, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Aug. 3, 1998, at 7B.
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President Clinton attempted to declare martial law on or about
January 1, 2000.161 Yet President Clinton’s attempt to enlarge the
power of the national government was strongly vetoed by state and
local officials, and state interests have temporarily won the ideologi-
cal battle over federalism. State and local groups gained a powerful
position in this debate by displaying an unprecedented show of force
in their mobilization to counter the 1998 Order.
Future administrations will likely think carefully before attempt-
ing to shift policy away from the states any time in the near future.
Congress has also demonstrated that it will respond in support of
state and local groups. The Big Seven and Congress have proven
themselves well-armed to challenge any presidential power grab. For
the time being, the balance of federalism hangs in favor of the states.
Jennie Holman Blake
161. See id.
